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I. Introduction
On May 4, 1982, the Florida Third District Court of Appeal up-
held the robbery and kidnapping conviction of Eugene Martinez even
though Martinez had not actually taken part in a robbery or a kidnap-
ping.' What Martinez had done, however, was to introduce a prospec-
tive buyer of marijuana to two sellers who subsequently kidnapped and
robbed the buyer when it came time to produce the drug. Martinez'
liability for these acts was predicated solely on the legal theory which
holds conspirators responsible for the natural and probable conse-
quences of their acts.2 The court stated, "[g]iving appropriate consider-
ation to experience in this community, we think . . . that robbery and
kidnapping are a foreseeable consequence of conspiracy to effect a
large drug transaction. . .. "s
This principle of accomplice liability, popularly known as the Pin-
kerton rule,4 has been almost universally condemned by the academic
community. 5 Yet since the early 1970s it has been applied with increas-
ing frequency, particularly in the context of narcotics prosecutions.6 Al-
*B.A. , Emory University; J. D. , University of Florida. The author is an assistant
United States Attorney for the Southern District of Florida. The views expressed in
this article are not necessarily those of the Department of Justice nor of the United
States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida.
1. Martinez v. State, 413 So. 2d 429 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
2. Id. at 430.
3 Id.
4. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946).
5. Note, Vicarious Liability For Criminal Offenses of Co-Conspirators, 56 YALE
L.J. 371 (1947); Note, Developments in the Law-Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L.
REV. 920, 998 (1959); W. LAFAVE & A. Scott, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 515
(1972); Note, Liability for Co-Conspirators Crimes in the Wisconsin Party to a Crime
Statute, 66 MARQUETTE L. REV. 344 (1983).
6. When W. Lafave and A. Scott published their HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW
in 1972, 'they reported at page 515 that the Pinkerton rule had "never gained broad
acceptance." This assertion is no longer correct. The Pinkerton rule has become en-
trenched in federal law. See, e.g., United States v. Raffone, 693 F.2d 1343, 1346 (11th
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though the principle applied in Martinez was known at common law, it
was not widely recognized until the United States Supreme Court de-
cided Pinkerton v. United States in 1946.7 In that case, two brothers,
Walter and Daniel Pinkerton, were charged with conspiring to evade
the payment of taxes on whiskey and, additionally, with numerous spe-
Cir. 1982) (prosecution for conspiracy to possess and possession with intent to dis-
tribute marijuana. The court held that liability cannot rest upon Pinkerton unless jury
is given a Pinkerton charge); Government of Virgin Islands v. Dowling, 633 F.2d 660,
666 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 960 (1980) (prosecution for conspiracy to commit
bank robbery and assault occurring as a result of the bank robbery); United States v.
Rosado-Fernandez, 614 F.2d 50, 53 (5th Cir. 1980) (prosecution for conspiracy to pos-
sess and possession with intent to distribute cocaine. The court notes that responsibility
extends even to those co-conspirator acts of which the defendant has no knowledge.);
United States v. Wilner, 523 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1975) (prosecution for conspiracy to
possess and possession with intent to distribute marijuana. "[W]here there is a continu-
ing conspiracy which contemplates and encompasses the illegal act performed, each
conspirator is responsible for the acts of his co-conspirator." Id. at 72-73.); Poliafico v.
United States, 237 F.2d 97, 116 (6th Cir. 1956) (prosecution for conspiracy to possess
and possession of heroin.).
The doctrine of accomplice liability has also been widely accepted by the states.
See, e.g., Martinez v. State, 413 So. 2d 429, 430-31 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982)
(defendant marijuana broker held responsible where sellers of marijuana robbed buyer
of funds to be used for purchase); State v. Barton, 424 A.2d 1033, 1038 (R.I. 1981)
(conspiracy to break into building and steal precious metals. Defendants held liable for
destruction of communication lines by co-conspirators done in furtherance of the con-
spiracy.); Commonwealth v. Roux, 350 A.2d 867, 871-72 (Pa. 1976) (defendant held
responsible for murder where he conspired with others to rob and beat victim); State v.
Stein, 70 N.J. 369, 360 A.2d 347, 359 (1976) (defendant, an attorney, held responsible
for robbery and assault, where he provided information to robbers for what he believed
would be a burglary of an unoccupied residence); Pendleton v. State, 329 So. 2d 145,
149 (Ala. Ct. App. 1976) (conspiracy to commit murder. Defendant held responsible
for murder based on prearrangement and presence alone); Johnson v. State, 482
S.W.2d 600, 605 (Ark. 1972) (defendant held vicariously liable for death of little girl
during burglary attempt); State v. Nutley, 24 Wis. 2d 527,__ 129 N.W.2d 155, 169
(1964) (presence of weapons supports inference that defendants wanted to avoid any
contact with police and thus assault or.police officer was a natural consequence of their
unlawful agreement); Lusk v. State, 64 Miss. 845, 2 So. 256 (1897) (defendant held
responsible for arson where he combined with two others to frighten a man and his wife
away from their house); The Anarchist's Case, 122 Ill. 1, 12 N.E. 865 (1887) (defen-
dant held responsible for death resulting from conspiracy to overthrow government).
North Carolina and New York have rejected the doctrine. See State v. Small, 272
S.E.2d 128 (N.C. 1980); People v. McGee, 49 N.Y. 2d 48, 399 N.E.2d 1177 (1979).
Massachusetts has never ascribed to the doctrine; see Commonwealth v. Stasium, 349
Mass. 38, 206 N.E. 2d 672 (1965).
7. 328 U.S. 640.
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cific acts of tax evasion. Although the evidence at trial established the
existence of a conspiracy, there was no evidence that Daniel Pinkerton
participated directly in the commission of any of the substantive of-
fenses and, in fact, he was in jail when some of these acts took place.8
At trial the court instructed the jury that if they found that the
defendants had been engaged in a conspiracy they could also find the
defendants guilty of any substantive offense which was a natural and
probable consequence of that conspiracy.9 Daniel Pinkerton was found
guilty of conspiracy and six substantive counts of tax evasion. His con-
viction was upheld by the Fifth Circuit 0 and the Supreme Court af-
firmed in an opinion written by Justice Douglas. The Supreme Court
held that a party to a conspiracy may be prosecuted for the substantive
crimes of a co-conspirator, committed in furtherance of the conspiracy,
even though the person did not participate in the crime and even if he
did not intend for that specific crime to occur."1
This rationale, known as the doctrine of accomplice liability, was
rarely utilized until the 1970s, when it became extremely popular
among state and federal prosecutors. Critics have argued that the ra-
tionale of Pinkerton represents an unwarranted extension of the civil
doctrine of respondeat superior into criminal jurisprudence;12 that it
violates the basic tenet of criminal law which holds that persons are
responsible only for their own conduct and not that of others;'3 that the
decision itself is flawed because Justice Douglas confused a rule of evi-
dence with a rule of criminal responsibility and relied on authorities
which upon close inspection do not stand for the broad proposition for
8. Id. at 648 (J. Rutledge dissenting).
9. Id. at 646 n.6.
10. 151 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1945).
11. 328 U.S. at 647-48.
12. Justice Rutledge, in his dissent in Pinkeiton, complained that holding Daniel
Pinkerton liable for the acts of his brother amounts to "vicarious criminal responsibility
as broad as, or broader than, the vicarious civil liability of a partner for acts done by a
co-partner in the course of the firm's business." Id. at 651.
13. "[I]t seems clear that the doctrine of respondeat superior must be repudiated
as a foundation for criminal liability. For it is of the very essence of our deep-rooted
notions of criminal liability that guilt be personal and individual; and in the last analy-
sis the inarticulate subconscious sense of justice of the man on the street is the only
sure foundation of law." Sayre, Criminal Responsibility For The Acts of Another, 43
HARV. L. REv. 689, 717 (1930); "[A]ny doctrine of vicarious criminal liability is re-
pugnant to common law concepts." Note, Vicarious Liability For Criminal Offenses of
Co-Conspirators, 56 YALE L.J. 371, 374 (1947).
1983]
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which they were cited. 14 Finally, it has been said that no court has put
forth an adequate rationale for the doctrine,15 and that because of the
real danger that jurors may confuse the issues in a conspiracy prosecu-
tion, the doctrine should be abandoned.1
This article argues that the critics of Pinkerton have confused the
civil doctrine of vicarious liability17 with the criminal doctrine of ac-
complice liability. It first explores how the common law treated various
parties to a criminal act and how some courts have recently analyzed
these common law precepts. It examines the relationship between these
precepts and the law of conspiracy. It then addresses the various critics
of Pinkerton, concluding that the doctrine of accomplice liability is not
an aberration, but rather, a reaffirmation of some basic tenets of the
common law.
II. The Parties to a Crime
A. At Common Law
The terms used at common law to describe the parties to a crime
arise naturally from the roles played by the various participants in the
commission of a criminal act. At common law there can be only three
parties to a crime-the principal in the first degree, the principal in the
second degree, and the accessory before the fact. Each is responsible
for the natural and probable consequences of his actions. The individ-
ual most directly responsible for the commission of a criminal act is
known as the principal in the first degree. Generally he is the person
who pulls the trigger or who utters the forged instrument; "the actor,
14. Recent Decisions, Criminal Law -Conspiracy and Substantive Offenses - Dis-
tinctions Between Conspirators and Accomplices - Conviction of Conspirators for Sub-
stantive Offenses, Although He Did Not Actually Participate in Them, 16 FORDHAM
L. REV. 275 (1947) [hereinafter cited as Recent Decisions].
15. Note, Developments in the Law - Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L. REV.
920, 998 (1959).
16. Note, supra note 13, at 377 (The author of this article believes that conspir-
acy prosecutions are likely to confuse'the jury because of the greater number of defen-
dants and the admissibility of the co-conspirator statements to show membership in the
conspiracy. Attenuated theories of liability therefore increase the chances of prejudicial
error.).
17. The tort doctrine of vicarious liability holds persons responsible for the acts
of others solely on the basis of their relationship as principal and agent. W. PROSSER,
THE LAW OF TORTS 467 (4th ed. 1971).
[Vol. 8
4
Nova Law Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 1 [1983], Art. 2
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol8/iss1/2
A Defense of Accomplice Liability
or absolute perpetrator of the crime."18 At common law, an individual
who employed an intermediary to commit a crime could not be consid-
ered a principal, even though he might have been the one most respon-
sible for the crime in the sense of having originated or initiated it.19
This did not mean that an individual who employed an intermediary
would be without criminal liability. As an accessory or a principal in
the second degree he would be subject to the same punishment as the
principal in the first degree.20 What it did mean, however, was that
common law jurists distinguished criminal actors, not in terms of their
ultimate legal or moral responsibility, but in terms of the specific acts
they performed.
Frequently a principal in the first degree is present at the time
that an offense is committed. Presence, however, is not required. If A
employs a child to pass a counterfeit check,2" or if A leaves poison for
another who subsequently drinks it,2 A is considered a principal in the
first degree under a theory of constructive presence.23 Similarly, if A
and B combine together to forge an instrument, each individually forg-
ing a separate part, both are principals in the first degree, even if they
were not present together when the instrument was completed.24
One who aids, counsels, commands, or encourages the principal in
the first degree is a principal in the second degree, more frequently
known as an aider and abettor.2 5 Fundamentally, what distinguishes a
principal in the second degree from a principal in the first degree is the
fact that without the acts taken by the principal in the first degree, the
18. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *34. "A principal in the first degree may
simply be defined as the criminal actor. He is the one who, with the requisite mental
state, engages in the act or omission concurring with a mental state which causes the
criminal result."'W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, 496 (1972).
19. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 18, at 496-7 (an exception to this rule is
where the intermediary is a child, is insane, or has been mislead as to the true nature of
his acts.) See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at 35.
20. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 18, ("[A]ccessories shall suffer the
same punishment as their principal.") 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at 39.
21. Commonwealth v. Hill, 11 Mass. 136 (1814).
22. Rex v. Harley, 172 Eng. Rep. 744 (1830).
23. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 18, at 497; State v. Deyo, 358 S.W.2d
816, 821 (Mo. 1962); W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at 34, 35.
24. Rex v. Bingley, 168 Eng. Rep. 890, 891 (1821).
25. W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 18 at 34 ("A principal, in the first degree, is he
that is the actor, or absolute perpetrator of the crime; and, in the second degree, he
who is present, aiding, and abetting the act to be done." Id.).
19831
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conduct of the principal in the second degree would not be criminal.2"
Thus, if A provides B with a ride to a bank, knowing that B intends to
rob the bank, A would not be guilty as an aider and abettor unless a
robbery actually took place.27
It is easy to identify the principal in the second degree when one
person acts while the other merely encourages. But when an individ-
ual's involvement is extensive, as where B restrains C so that A can
shoot C, the distinctions become blurred. 8 Generally, one must be pre-
sent at the commission of a criminal offense to be an aider and abet-
tor.29 Presence, however, may be constructive as well as actual. Thus,
where B is in a position to alert A30 or prevent others from interfering
with A3 or where B's actions are such as to make A's job easier,32 B is
held to be constructively present, no matter how far away he is from
26. United States v. Rodgers, 419 F.2d 1315, 1317 (10th Cir. 1969) (the govern-
ment's failure to show that anyone instigated a riot precluded the defendants' convic-
tions for aiding and abetting in the instigation of a riot); Shuttlesworth v. City of Bir-
mingham, Ala., 373 U.S. 262, 265 (1963) (where trespass conviction of principal was
held to be constitutionally infirm, conviction of aider and abettor was likewise infirm);
United States v. Horton, 180 F.2d 431, 437 (7th Cir. 1950) (the government's failure
to show that the principal was not registered to distribute marijuana precluded the
defendants' conviction for aiding and abetting in an unlawful distribution).
27. Today persons who engage in a conspiracy, solicit others to commit an of-
fense, or attempt to commit an offense themselves, may be subjected to punishment
even when no substantive crime has occurred; this was not so at common law. Because
ancient law exacted reparations for harm done, no punishment was exacted where
harm was attempted, but none occurred. Reparations consisted of a fine paid to the
injured party and to the king. Thus, early criminal law shared the same purpose and
origin as early tort law. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 509 (1898).
28. Consequently, most jurisdictions have abolished the distinctions between ac-
cessories and principals in the first and second degrees. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1981)
which defines principals as "[W]hoever commits an offense against the United States
or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as
a principal."
29. United States v. Molina, 581 F.2d 56, 61 n.8 (2d Cir. 1978); W. LAFAVE
AND A. SCOTT, supra note 18, at 497.
30. Vincent v. State, 220 Md. 232, 239, 151 A.2d 898, 903 (1959); Mitchell v.
Commonwealth, 33 Va. (1 Gratt) 845, 867 (1880).
31. State v. Tally, 102 Ala. 25, 76, 15 So. 722 (1894); W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT,
supra note 18, at 498.
32. Dean v. State, 85 Miss. 40, 42, 37 So. 501, 502 (1904); State v. Tally, 102
Ala. 25, 76-76, 15 So. 722, 740 (1894); State v. Poynoir, 36 La. Ann. 572, 575 (1884);
State v. Hamilton, 13 Nev. 386, 391 (1878).
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the scene of the crime.3 One who enters into an agreement which
counsels, commands or encourages the commission of a crime but who
is not present at the crime, either constructively or actually, is known
as an accessory before the fact.3 4
What distinguishes the accessory before the fact from the princi-
pal in the second degree is primarily the lack of presence. In some cir-
cumstances, however, the two are distinguishable on the basis of the
existence of an agreement.3 5 It is always necessary for there to be an
agreement between an accessory and a principal in order to hold the
accessory liable.36 A principal in the second degree, however, may be
held liable based on his intent and his actions independent of any inter-
course between him and the principal. 7 It is sometimes said that what
the principal in the second degree shares with the principal in the first
degree is a "community of unlawful intent."38 But as the Fifth Circuit
has observed, community of unlawful intent, while similar to an agree-
ment, is not the same.3 9 A defendant may voluntarily aid the principal
in the commission of a criminal act and be liable as principal in the
second degree, but not be liable as a conspirator or an accessory before
the fact because of the absence of an actual agreement to do an unlaw-
33. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 18, at 497-98.
34. An accessory before the fact is one "who being absent at the time of the
crime committed doth yet procure, counsel, or command another to commit a crime." 4
BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at 36.
35. Sams v. Commonwealth, 294 Ky. 393, 396, 171 S.W.2d 989, 991 (1943).
36. See, e.g., Morei v. U.S., 127 F.2d 827, 830 (6th Cir. 1942) (where the ab-
sence of an agreement between the defendant and the principal led the Sixth Circuit to
hold that the defendant was not responsible for the principal's sale of narcotics even
though the defendant's actions enabled the buyer to contact the seller).
37. In State v. Tally, R. C. Ross made the fatal mistake of seducing Anne Skel-
ton. Skelton's three brothers became enraged at what had happened to Anne and set
out to murder Ross, who lived nearby. The whole community was aware of what the
Skelton clan had set out to do and Ed Ross, a relative of R. C. Ross, sent him a
telegram, stating, "[flour men on horseback with guns following. Look out." John B.
Tally, a judge of the Ninth Judicial Circuit of Alabama who was Anne's brother-in-law
became aware of Ed's telegram and sent his own telegram to the telegraph officer who
was a personal friend. "Do not let warned party get away. Say nothing." As a result of
this telegram R. C. Ross never received Ed Ross's warnings. Even though the Skeltons
were not aware of his assistance Tally was still held to be an aider and abettor. 102
Ala. at 70, 15 So. at 739.
38. U.S. v. Bright, 630 F.2d 804,813 (5th Cir. 1980).
39. United States v. Bright, 630 F.2d 804, 813 (5th Cir. 1980). But see Russell
v. United States, 222 F.2d 197, 199 (5th Cir. 1955) (where the court confuses commu-
nity of unlawful intent with agreement.).
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ful act. For example, where C encourages B to murder X and A de-
cides to help B independent of any encouragement by C or communica-
tion with B and B does in fact murder X with A's aid, A is a principal
in the second degree because he was present, he aided B, and he shared
in B's intent. C is an accessory before the fact because he was not
present and because he entered into an agreement with B. A, though
present at the scene, is not a principal in the first degree because his
liability is dependent upon B actually killing X.4"
The distinctions made by the common law based on the roles
played by the participants in a crime do not explain, however, why the
common law treated accessories differently from principals. Although
each was held equally liable for an offense, and subject to the same
penalty, common law jurists erected numerous barriers to the prosecu-
tion of accessories. Some of these barriers were undoubtedly designed
to limit the imposition of the death penalty, which was the punishment
for all felonies at common law.,1 An accessory, for instance, could only
be tried in the jurisdiction where the crime of accessoryship occurred."2
Thus, the accessory who committed his acts in France could not be
prosecuted for the resultant crime in England because venue for him
lay only in France.43 Similarly, an accessory could not be convicted
under an indictment charging him as a principal. Where the extent of
an individual's participation was unknown, this rule operated to relieve
the party of any liability at all."
The rule that an accessory could not be convicted unless the prin-
cipal was also convicted probably had a different and more ancient ori-
gin. Since, at early common law, guilt or innocence was determined by
a supernatural process, such as trial by water, the medieval mind could
not risk the contradiction that would occur if any accessory were found
guilty where the principal was found innocent.4 5 "What should we
think of the God who suffered the principal to come clean from the
40. If A's assistance was solicited by C but his presence in no way aided B, that
is, if A with no intent to aid B goes to the scene of the crime and, unknown to B,
watches as B murders X, A would not be an aider and abettor. His liability, if any,
would rest upon his prior agreement with A and would be that of an accessory. W.
LAFAvE & A. ScoTT, supra note 18, at 498, 503.
41. W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at 18.
42. People v. Hodges, 27 Cal. 340, 341 (1865).
43. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 18, at 499.
44. Id. at 499-500.
45. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 27, at 509.
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ordeal after the accessory had blistered his hand. 46 Modern legisla-
tures, less troubled by such contradictions, have for the most part elim-
inated these rules. Nevertheless, most statutes still employ common-law
terms to describe parties to a crime. When a statute uses a common-
law term without defining it, the legislature is presumed to have in-
tended the common law meaning.47 Therefore, "it is still necessary to
apply the common law rules in order to determine whether a person,
who is absent when a crime is committed by another, is guilty as a
principal. 48
B. Some Modern Interpretations of the Common-Law Concepts
of Parties to a Crime
In Morei v. United States,'49 a physician, Dr. Matthew Platt, was
convicted of various charges arising out of the sale of heroin to an in-
former. Dr. Platt, who was well known for his interest in horse racing,
was approached by Paul Beach, who was acting under the direction of
government narcotics agents. Beach asked Platt if he would supply her-
oin to stimulate horses. Platt told Beach that he did not have any her-
oin but gave Beach the name of Louis Morei.50 Platt instructed Beach
to tell Morei that the doctor had sent him; and Platt assured Beach
that Morei would take care of him. 1 On appeal to the Sixth Circuit
the doctor contended that he was not guilty of any crime and the court
agreed. It rejected the government's argument that Platt was a princi-
pal because Morei could not have been in contact with Beach except
for Platt's actions. The court reasoned that this theory would open up
"a vast field of offenses that have never been comprehended within the
common law."' 2 It cited to the decision by Judge Learned Hand in
United States v. Peoni,5 3 and concluded that the definitions of aid,
abet, induce, and procure have nothing to do with the probability that a
result will flow from certain conduct.' Rather, these terms refer to the
46. Id. at 509.
47. U.S. v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 411 (1957).
48. Morei v. United States, 127 F.2d 827, 830 (6th Cir. 1942).
49. 127 F.2d 827 (6th Cir. 1942).
50. Id. at 829.
51. Id. at 830.
52. Id. at 831.
53. 100 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1938).
54. Morei v. United States, 127 F.2d at 831.
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specific conduct of the accused.55
There was no evidence of an agreement between Platt and Morei
(which would have made Platt an accessory) nor was Platt actually or
constructively present when the crime was committed (which would
have made him an aider and abettor). Platt's actions, which undoubt-
edly contributed to the crime, were insufficient, in the eyes of the
Morei court, to establish the doctor's criminal responsibility. Thus, in
the court's view assistance alone may not be sufficient to make one ac-
countable for the commission of an offense. Assistance must be joined
with some sort of mental element. In Morei, Dr. Platt clearly knew
that Beach wanted heroin. But the court did not believe that merely
knowing that one's services or products would be used for illicit pur-
poses was sufficient to establish liability. 56 To be held accountable, it
ruled, the accomplice must have the same intent as the principal. 57
Fundamentally, what was missing in Morel was any evidence of an
agreement on Platt's part to aid Morei in distributing heroin. Such evi-
dence was required since Platt was charged only with being an acces-
sory to Morei's crime. But what if Beach had been charged with an
offense? That is, what if Platt had been accused of being an accessory
to Beach's crime? There were, after all, direct talks between Platt and
Beach. 58 The Ninth Circuit faced this very situation in Robinson v.
United States.59 The defendant, Jesse Robinson, was charged as an
aider and abettor to the purchase of heroin by Tom Lowe. Robinson's
only involvement, however, was providing Lowe with a telephone num-
ber."' The government argued that providing the telephone number
made it easier for Lowe to commit his crime.6 1 Relying on Morei, the
Ninth Circuit rejected this argument. According to the court, Robin-
son's aid was no different from the aid given Lowe by the telephone
company or even by the company that manufactured Lowe's automo-
bile.62 The Robinson court conceded that these acts could be consid-
ered links in the chain of causation, but refused to extend criminal lia-
bility to such acts. 3
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 829.
59. 262 F.2d 645 (9th Cir. 1959).
60. Id. at 647.
61. Id. at 649.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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Surely there is a difference between a person who knowingly pro-
vides the telephone number of a source of heroin and a person who
ignorantly provides a service to one who, in part aided by that service,
goes out and commits a crime. The analogy in Robinson is faulty be-
cause there was no evidence that the telephone company knew that
Lowe intended to use their equipment to purchase heroin. Where a ven-
dor knows that his goods or services will be used for an illegal purpose
his liability depends upon whether that knowledge can be equated with
intent." This is because society holds liable only those accessories who
actually intend for a crime to occur.6 5 A better rationale for absolving
Robinson of responsibility would be that the act of giving Lowe a tele-
phone number, even with the knowledge of how Lowe intended to use
it, was not sufficient to show that he wanted Lowe to purchase heroin.66
Lowe's actions were insufficient evidence of an agreement between the
two. Where a crime occurs as the result of a criminal conspiracy, how-
ever, the situation is quite different. There, at least for some purposes,
the conspirator does share the same criminal intent as the principal in
64. Peoni, 100 F.2d at 403.
65. Id.
66. Where a vendor knowingly profits from the use of his goods or services for
the commission of a crime it seems reasonable for that vendor to be subject to some
form of liability. Lafave and Scott, citing Jindra v. United States, 69 F.2d 429 (5th
Cir. 1934) and Vukich v. United States, 28 F.2d 666 (9th Cir. 1928), discuss the liabil-
ity of the vendor who "sells with knowledge that the subject of the sale will be used in
commission of a crime," and note that, "The earlier decisions generally held that aid
with knowledge was enough. . . ." They argue, however, that the better view, as ex-
pressed in United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1938), is that the vendor must
himself wish the crime to occur. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 18, at 508.
Not everyone subscribes to this view. See, e.g., Backnm v. United States, 112 F.2d
635 (4th Cir. 1940) ("The seller may not ignore the purpose for which the purchase is
made if he is advised of that purpose, or wash his hands of the aid that he has given the
perpetrator of a felony by the plea that he has merely made a sale of merchandise. One
who sells a gun to another knowing that he is buying it to commit a murder would
hardly escape conviction as an accessory to the murder by showing that he received full
price for the gun. . .") Id. at 637.
A compromise between these two views is reflected in the Criminal Code Reform
Act of 1981. If enacted it would create a new category of offense which would punish
those who knowingly (as opposed to intentionally) facilitate the commission of an of-
fense by providing substantial assistance to the principal. This offense applies only to
persons who provide substantial assistance and limits punishment to that applicable to
offenses two grades below the offenses facilitated. Report of the Committee on the
Judiciary, United States Senate, To Accompany § 1630, Criminal Code Reform Act of
1981, S. REP. No. 97-307, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
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the first degree.
III. The Law of Conspiracy
Most jurisdictions define a conspiracy as a combination between
two or more persons formed for the purpose of doing either an unlawful
act or a lawful act by unlawful means. 7 The gist of the offense is the
agreement and thus conspirators may be punished even where the pur-
pose of the conspiracy is not achieved.68 What distinguishes the acces-
sory before the fact from the conspirator is that the accessory's liability
depends upon the completion of a substantive offense while the conspir-
ator's liability begins from the moment that he enters into an unlawful
agreement.6 9 The terms accessory and principal are therefore merely
descriptive of a role played by a party to a crime, while the term con-
spiracy describes a crime itself. An accessory before the fact will al-
ways be chargeable as a conspirator although not every conspirator will
be chargeable as an accessory. This fact is significant for two reasons.
From the standpoint of prosecutorial discretion, it means that whenever
the purpose of a conspiracy is achieved, an individual conspirator may
be charged with two offenses; a substantive offense, based upon his role
as an accessory to a completed crime, and a conspiracy by virtue of his
entry into an unlawful agreement. From an evidentiary standpoint, it
means that in establishing an individual's liability for the commission
of a crime, a finder of fact may consider an individual's membership in
a conspiracy in order to determine whether that individual is an acces-
sory before the fact. In other words, liability for the commission of a
substantive offense does not flow from membership in a conspiracy, but
rather evidence of one's membership in a conspiracy may establish
one's role as an accessory before the fact.
Although closely related, there exists a fundamental difference be-
tween the liability of the conspirator and that of the accessory. A con-
67. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 18, at 454; United States v. Hutto, 256
U.S. 524, 528-29 (1921).
68. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 18, at 454; United States v. Rabino-
wich, 238 U.S. 78, 86 (1915).
69. Compare United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78 (holding that a conspira-
tor may be punished even when the purpose of the conspiracy is not achieved) and
Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211 (1945) (noting that an overt act was not re-
quired at common law) with United States v. Rodgers, 419 F.2d 1315 (10th Cir. 1969)
(holding that the failure to show that anyone had instigated a riot precluded the defen-
dants' convictions for aiding and abetting).
[Vol. 8
12
Nova Law Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 1 [1983], Art. 2
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol8/iss1/2
A Defense of Accomplice Liability
spirator's liability attaches from the moment he enters into the conspir-
atorial agreement.7 0  Although a jurisdiction may require the
commission of some overt act7" as a condition for a conspiracy prosecu-
tion, and although, as an evidentiary matter, the acts and statements of
co-conspirators (even those occurring before the defendant joined the
conspiracy) may be introduced against other co-conspirators, it is the
agreement and nothing else which society finds offensive.7 2 An acces-
sory's liability, however, depends upon the completion of an actual
crime.73 Contrary to what most critics of accomplice liability maintain,
an accessory is responsible only for the acts of his confederates which
occurred subsequent to and as a result of the accessory's actual assis-
tance or encouragement.
The relationship between conspiracy and accessories before the
fact was recognized by the Supreme Court of Illinois in a case which
arose out of the infamous Haymarket Square Massacre. In The An-
archist Case,4 the defendants, members of a revolutionary society,
convened an open air meeting near Haymarket Square in Chicago.
Bombs were manufactured and distributed by one of the defendants
before the meeting and speeches began.75 The crowd became excited
and when the police attempted to disperse them a bomb exploded, kill-
ing a large number of police. There was no evidence that any of the
defendants threw the bomb.7 6 Nevertheless, each was convicted of mur-
der. In upholding the defendants' convictions, the court first noted that
each was a member of a conspiracy which preached the overthrow of
the government and which manufactured bombs to be used in the
revolution. The defendants' liability, however, did not flow from their
membership in the conspiracy. Rather, the evidence of the conspiracy
was used to show a common design to encourage the violence which
occurred. Its purpose at trial was to establish the position of the mem-
70. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 18, at 459.
71. While the common law did not predicate conspirational liability on the com-
mission of an overt act, see, e.g.. Fiswick v. U.S., 329 U.S. 211, 216 n.4 (1946) , many
modern statutes do. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1981), which predicates liability on the
doing of any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, with 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1981)
which has no such requirements.
72. U.S. v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. at 88.
73. See supra note 26.
74. 122 Ill. 1, 12 N.E. 865, affid on other grounds, 123 U.S. 131 (1887).
75. Id. at 100, 12 N.E. at 914.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 119-20, 133-34, 12 N.E. 923-24, 930-31.
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bers of the conspiracy as accessories so that they could be found liable
for the crime of murder under an accomplice liability theory."8
IV. An Analysis of the Pinkerton Rule
Although the evidence presented at trial in Pinkerton v. United
States 9 demonstrated the existence of a conspiracy, there was no evi-
dence to connect Daniel Pinkerton to any action taken in regard to the
untaxed whiskey.80 Nevertheless, the jury was instructed that if they
found the defendants to be members of a conspiracy they could, on that
basis alone, convict the defendants of any substantive act committed infurtherance of the conspiracy."' In upholding Daniel Pinkerton's con-
victions for substantive violations of the Internal Revenue Code, Justice
Douglas focused upon that body of conspiracy law which holds that the
overt act of one partner to a crime is attributable to all. 2 Since an
overt act is an essential ingredient in the crime of conspiracy, the Court
did not "see [any reason] why the same or other acts in furtherance of
the conspiracy . . . [should not be] attributable to the others for the
purpose of holding them responsible for the substantive offense."8"
The Court's reliance on those authorities that attribute to all
members of a conspiracy the overt acts of any one conspirator has been
severely criticized." As critics of Pinkerton have correctly pointed out,
the purpose of the overt act rule is simply to establish that a conspiracy
has passed beyond mere words; that it has reached a point where it
poses a sufficiently real threat to society that sanctions should be im-
posed.85 Its function is solely to prevent persons from being prosecuted
for making assertions that they had no intention to act upon. The overt
act, which may be purely innocent and lawful in itself, is wholly sepa-
rate from the conspiracy.88 Contrary to the dicta in Pinkerton, 7 it is
78. Id. at 102, 225-26, 12 N.E. at 915, 974.
79. 328 U.S. 640 (1946).
80. Id. at 645.
81. Id. at 645, n.6.
82. Id. at 647.
83. 328 U.S. at 647.
84. Note, supra note 15, at 998; Recent Decisions, supra note 14, at 277.
85. Recent Decisions, supra note 14 at 277. People v. McGee, 49 N.Y.2d 48, 58,
399 N.E.2d 1177, 1182 (1979), cert. denied sub nom. Quamina v. New York, 446 U.
S. 942 (1980).
86. Recent Decisions, supra note 14, at 277.
87. While the court's statement at page 647 that "an overt act is an essential
[Vol. 8
14
Nova Law Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 1 [1983], Art. 2
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol8/iss1/2
A Defense of Accomplice Liability
not even an essential element of a conspiracy."8 To the extent that
Douglas relied upon the overt act rule, the opinion is flawed. But Doug-
las relied as well on "[t]he rule which holds responsible one who coun-
sels, procures, or commands another to commit a crime .. ."I9 This
second ground is the real authority for the Pinkerton rule and is merely
a restatement of the common law doctrine which holds accessories lia-
ble for the natural and probable consequences of their acts.
Many critics claim that the doctrine of accomplice liability is an
extension of the doctrine of vicarious liability to criminal prosecution
and that this is foreign to the common law. But these two doctrines
differ substantially from each other. The tort doctrine of respondeat
superior did not develop in its present form until just prior to the end
of the seventeenth century.90 Between 1300 and 1700 a master's liabil-
ity for the acts of his servant was confined to those situations where the
master specifically commanded or authorized a servant to commit a
tortious act.91 After Boson v. Sanford9 2 and Turberville v. Stamp,93 the
requirement of an express or implied command disappeared. From
1700 on, the doctrine was expanded to hold principals civilly liable for
any tortious act of their agents committed within the scope of their
employment and during the course of business." But in 1730, not long
after the development of the doctrine of respondeat superior, an En-
glish court determined in Rex v. Huggins9" that this doctrine had no
place in criminal law. A warden was held not to be criminally responsi-
ble for the death of a prisoner where the death resulted from the acts
of a deputy warden who acted without the command or knowledge of
the defendant.9"
It is important to distinguish the doctrine of vicarious liability,
ingredient of the crime of conspiracy under § 37 of the Criminal Code, 18 U.S.C. §
88" was literally correct it cannot be said that this requirement bears any relation to
the doctrine of accomplice liability, a doctrine which developed at a time when there
was no overt act requirement.
88. It was not required at common law and it is not required under federal law
unless specified by statute. Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 216 (1945); United
States v. Cuni, 689 F.2d 1353, 1356 (11th Cir. 1982).
89. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. at 647.
90. Sayre, supra note 13, at 692.
91. Id. at 691.
92. 91 Eng. Rep. 382 (1689).
93. 92 Eng. Rep. 944 (1697).
94. Sayre, supra note 13, at 693.
95. 92 Eng. Rep. 518 (1730).
96. Sayre, supra note 13, at 700-01.
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which holds persons responsible solely on the basis of their business
relationship, from the doctrine of accomplice liability, which holds per-
sons liable only for those events which occur as a foreseeable conse-
quence of a criminal agreement.97 Those critics of Pinkerton who have
failed to understand this distinction have failed in part because of
Judge Hand's faulty analysis in Peoni. Judge Hand erred when he con-
cluded that common law jurists did not intend for accomplice liability
to include results which were the probable consequence of a criminal
agreement.98 His conclusion appears to be based solely upon his own
understanding of the words used to describe the accomplice's acts and
not upon a consideration of actual cases. An examination of case law
reveals that over a hundred years before the doctrine of respondeat
superior appeared, the principle of accomplice liability was well
developed.
In Regina v. Saunders,9" decided in 1573, two individuals, Saun-
ders and Archer, were charged with the murder of Saunders' daughter.
Saunders, who wanted to kill his wife, confided in Archer, who sug-
gested that Saunders poison her and who then procured the poison for
his friend. The poison was placed in an apple intended for the wife but
eaten instead by the daughter. Upholding the conviction of Saunders,
the court acknowledged that he did not intend for his daughter to die.
Nevertheless, ". . . it is every man's business to foresee what wrong or
mischief may happen from that which he does with an ill intention, and
it shall be no excuse for him to say that he intended to kill another, and
not the person killed." 100 The court, however, reversed the conviction of
Archer, finding that the death of the daughter was never intended by
Archer and was distinct from the agreement to which he was privy.10 1
While Judge Hand would undoubtedly have approved of this result, the
court's reasoning was very different from what he would have expected.
Plowden, who reported the decision in Saunders, analyzed the case in
unmistakably causative terms, "it seems to me reasonable that he who
advises or commands an unlawful Thing to be done shall be adjudged
Accessory to all that follows from the same Thing, but not from any
other distinct Things."102
97. Sayre, supra note 13, at 703-04.
98. United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d at 402.
99. 75 Eng. Rep. 706 (1573).
100. Id. at 708.
101. Id. at 709.
102. Id.
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Nearly 125 years later Saunders was cited in Rex v. Plummer.103
In Plummer, eight persons attempted to smuggle a quantity of wool
from England to France. Before they could get this wool aboard ship,
they were stopped by a company of the king's officers. A weapon was
fired and one of the smugglers was killed. It was not known which of
the eight fired a weapon; nevertheless Plummer was found guilty under
an accomplice liability theory. In reviewing the defendant's conviction,
the court noted that:
[t]he design of doing any act makes it deliberate; and if the fact be
deliberate, though no hurt to any person can be foreseen, yet if the
intent be felonious, and the fact designed, if committed, would be
felony, and in pursuit thereof a person is killed by accident, it will
be murder in him and all his accomplices.104
It was not known whether the smuggler was shot by a bullet meant for
one of the king's men or because of some motive unconnected with the
smuggling operation. The court held that it could not determine
whether the killing was a natural and probable consequence of the
crime, and therefore, Plummer's conviction was reversed.1"5 It was re-
versed not because the common law did not view accomplice liability in
terms of probabilities, but precisely because it did. It was this principle,
long recognized at common law, which led the Supreme Court of Illi-
nois in The Anarchist Case,106 to conclude that the defendants were
guilty of murder, not merely because of their membership in a conspir-
acy, but by virtue of their status as accessories before the fact, estab-
lished through evidence of their conspiracy.1 07
Commentators Lafave and Scott, two of the severest critics of Pin-
kerton, claim that the main justification in support of accomplice liabil-
ity lies in the fact that crimes occurring as a result of a conspiracy are
frequently performed as part of a larger division of labor; by declaring
allegiance to a particular common object, a conspirator has implicitly
assented to the commission of foreseeable crimes in furtherance of the
object.108 Critical of this rationale, they argue that criminal responsibil-
ity should depend upon "something more than the attenuated connec-
103. 84 Eng. Rep. 1103 (1701).
104. Id. at 1107.
105. Id.
106. See The Anarchist Case, 122 Ill. 1, 12 N.E. 865 (1887).
107. Id. at 915.
108. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 18, at 514.
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tion resulting solely from membership in a conspiracy and the objective
standard of what is reasonably foreseeable. [Otherwise, the] . ..law
would lose all sense of just proportion. ' 09
[E]ach prostitute or runner in a large commercialized vice ring
could be held liable for an untold number of acts of prostitution by
persons unknown to them and not directly aided by them. Each
retailer in an extensive narcotics ring could be held accountable as
an accomplice to every sale of narcotics made by every other re-
tailer in that vast conspiracy.11°
This critique, however, assumes that a conspirator's liability for a sub-
stantive offense flows solely from his role as a member of a conspiracy.
Membership in a conspiracy, however, is merely evidence tending to
establish the conspirator's status as an accessory before the fact."' It
serves as evidence of an agreement connecting the accessory to the
principal. Absent that direct connection, one can be in a conspiracy
with the principal but not be an accessory to a crime committed by the
principal.
Critics of Pinkerton frequently misinterpret the case as having an-
nounced a doctrine of liability predicated upon one's mere membership
in a conspiracy.11 2 For example, in State v. Small,1 3 the defendant
109. Id. (quoting from 1 National Comm'n on Reform of Federal Criminal Law
Working Papers 156 (1970)).
110. Id.
111. State v. Small, 272 S.E.2d 128, 136, 139 (N.C. 1980). The National
Comm'n on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws has recommended that the Pinkerton
Rule be abandoned because it raises problems which could otherwise be avoided: (a) Is
the co-conspirator liable for crimes committed before he joined the conspiracy, as he is
for overt acts (a principle which serves another purpose)? (b) Do different rules of
evidence apply to his liability for conspiracy and his liability for the specific offense?
(c) Can he be acquitted for conspiracy and re-tried for the specific offense? (d) Should
the test of withdrawal from the conspiracy be the same as for terminating liability for
the specific offense?
National Comm'n on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, Working Papers 157 (1970)
as quoted in W. LAFAVE & A. Scott, supra note 18, at 514 n.14.
Each of these objections is the result of the Commission's faulty understanding of
Pinkerton. The doctrine of accomplice liability flows from one's status as an accessory
before the fact as evidenced by one's membership in a conspiracy. Properly understood,
the doctrine is not susceptible to any of these objections.
112. In his dissent in Pinkerton, Justice Rutledge argued that the majority had
violated both the letter and spirit of what Congress did when it separately defined the
three classes of crime. According to Justice Rutledge, "[t]he gist of conspiracy is the
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solicited someone to murder his wife. Although the defendant was not
present when the killing took place, he was indicted for first degree
murder. Under North Carolina law an accessory before the fact is held
to be distinct from the principal in the first and second degree. " 4 One
must be specifically indicted as an accessory, and an accessory to mur-
der can only be sentenced to a maximum of life imprisonment.1 5 Al-
though Small was unquestionably an accessory before the fact, the jury
was charged that if they found the killing to have been in furtherance
of the agreement, it was their duty to return a verdict of first degree
murder." 6 Small was found guilty as charged and sentenced to death.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Carolina was asked to con-
sider whether the doctrine of accomplice liability could render a party,
whose conduct would otherwise be that of an accessory before the fact,
a principal in the first degree. The court said no and reversed the con-
viction. To the extent that Pinkerton, as well as its own decisions, had
announced an independent principle of substantive liability, the court
held that those cases were inconsistent with traditional common law
limitations on liability.1 7 Thus, under no acceptable theory could the
court consider Small to be a principal. Although finding the Pinkerton
rule to be unsound," 8 the court correctly held that, to the extent that
agreement. . ." While "that of aiding, abetting or counseling is consciously advising
or assisting another to commit particular offenses .... But when conspiracy has rip-
ened into completed crime, or has advanced to the stage of aiding and abetting, it
becomes easy to disregard their differences and loosely to treat one as identical with the
other . . . ." 328 U.S. at 649.
What Justice Rutledge failed to recognize, however, is that Congress itself blurred
the distinctions when it placed aiders and abettors and accessories before the fact
within the same statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1981). While it is true that the gist of
conspiracy is the agreement and that there are significant differences between a con-
spirator and an aider and abettor there is no difference between what a conspirator
does and what an accessory does. A distinction arises only when a substantive crime is
committed as a result of an agreement.
113. 272 S.E.2d 128 (N.C. 1980).
114. Id. at 132-133.
115. Id. at 131 n.2.
116. Id. at 131.
117. Id. at 134.
118. Id. at 134.
"Such a broad reading [of Pinkerton] leads to the rather startling result
that a conspirator's criminal liability for the act of another may be based
less upon the circumstances of his personal participation than upon his
presumed status as 'partner' in all actions which proximately result from
the venture originally agreed upon. Fictions and presumption derived from
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an individual's membership in a conspiracy is evidence of that individ-
ual's status as an accessory before the fact, he may be held responsible
for the acts of the principal committed in furtherance of the criminal
agreement.11 9
In a dramatic fashion Small demonstrates the importance of un-
derstanding the true nature of accomplice liability. At common law
there are only three parties to a crime. Each party is responsible for the
natural and probable consequences of his acts. A principal in the first
degree is responsible for the death of any human being if that death
results from his attempt to kill a specific human being. A principal in
the second degree is likewise held responsible for any act done by the
principal in the first degree with his assistance. An accessory before the
fact is held responsible for any act taken by the principals which is a
natural and probable consequence of their criminal agreement. This is
the doctrine of accomplice liability. Membership in a conspiracy does
not make a conspirator automatically a party to a substantive offense.
Membership in a conspiracy, however, is evidence of his status as an
accessory before the fact and, to the extent that he is an accessory
before the fact, he is responsible for the natural and probable conse-
quence of his actions. 2°
the civil law of agency and partnership thus commingle with tort law no-
tions of foreseeability and proximate cause to provide a stew of expanded
criminal liability."
id.
119. Id. at 136-37-.
In sum, a defendant's conspiratorial involvement may often be strong evi-
dence of his liability as a party to a crime which arose out of the conspir-
acy. His status as a party- whether he is to be deemed a principal or an
accessory before the fact - will nevertheless turn upon his presence at or
absence from the place of the crime's commission. His involvement in con-
spiracy itself will not alone make him a principal, or, for that matter, an
accessory either. . . . For reasons stated earlier and for those which follow,
we conclude that the co-conspirator rule in this state is not and has never
been intended to be taken as a separate rule of substantive liability which
erases the common law distinctions among criminal parties. Any indica-
tions in our case law to the contrary are expressly disapproved.
Id.
120. The critics of Pinkerton are not the only ones who have made this mistake.
The Criminal Reform Act of 1981, § 1630 codifies Pinkerton on the belief that Pinker-
ton announced a theory of conspiratorial liability independent of the common law doc-
trine of accomplice liability. The Committee's conclusion that, "the Pinkerton rule...
is firmly rooted in the principles underlying the law of conspiracy. . . ." Report of the
Committee on the Judiciary, supra note 66, though understandable, is fundamentally
[Vol. 8
20
Nova Law Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 1 [1983], Art. 2
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol8/iss1/2
A Defense of Accomplice Liability
V. Conclusion
Pinkerton does no more than restate the outer limits of criminal
responsibility, limits which were explored as early as 1573. Should
these limits be constricted? Lafave and Scott argue that criminal liabil-
ity should not attach where a criminal act was not specifically contem-
plated and intended by the accused. 2 But there exists a fundamental
difference between an individual who with knowledge of a crime pro-
vides a service to a criminal and one who intentionally enters into a
criminal agreement. The argument that Pinkerton makes persons crim-
inally liable as a result of their negligence ignores the fact that persons
who voluntarily enter into a criminal conspiracy do not do so through
any act of negligence. The Pinkerton rule limits liability to those acts
which are done in furtherance of the criminal agreement and this pro-
vision protects accessories from the acts of principals done indepen-
dently of the conspiracy.1 22 Where, however, the principal commits an
act which was both foreseeable and in furtherance of the unlawful
agreement, the doctrine of accomplice liability does no more than hold
the accessory accountable for initiating or maintaining an otherwise
avoidable chain of events.
In Martinez v. State,123 although the defendant may not have in-
tended for a robbery and a kidnapping to occur, it is not likely that he
would contest the observation that violence is a foreseeable conse-
quence of a narcotics conspiracy.124 Of course, foreseeability is not the
same as intent, and to equate the two may be a fiction, but it is no
flawed.
121. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 18, at 516.
122. The felony murder rule is both a descendant and a mutation of the doctrine
of accomplice liability. Where the doctrine of accomplice liability requires a jury to
find that the crime was a natural and probable consequence of the criminal agreement,
the felony murder rule irrebutably presumes that death is a foreseeable consequence of
certain violent felonies. Where the doctrine of accomplice liability requires a jury to
find that the crime was committed in furtherance of the criminal agreement, the felony
murder rule will in some circumstances hold accomplices liable for a killing done by a
third party. The felony murder rule is thus susceptible to far more serious objections.
W. LAFAVE & A. Scott, supra note 18, at 560.
123. Martinez v. State, 413 So. 2d 429 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
124. Indeed as the Second Circuit has observed: "Experience on the trial and
appellate benches has taught that substantial dealers in narcotics keep firearms on their
premises as tools of the trade almost to the same extent that they keep scales, glassine
bags, cutting equipment and other narcotics equipment." U.S. v. Weimer, 534 F.2d 15,
18 (2d Cir. 1976).
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more a fiction than the principle which holds one responsible for mur-
der when the person killed was not the person intended.125
Fundamentally, where Lafave and Scott and other commentators
have erred is in their attempt to apply the principle of personal respon-
sibility to crimes committed as a result of a criminal agreement. The
general rule that persons are accountable only for those acts which they
intend and in which they participate makes sense when an individual
takes it upon himself to bring about a certain result. But where an
individual associates with others and his associates commit acts which
are a foreseeable consequence of their agreement, that individual
should not be permitted to hide behind his associates and escape liabil-
ity. Critics who have claimed that there is no sound rationale for the
Pinkerton rule fail to understand that society has the right to establish
the highest standards of accountability. The fact that this principle of
accomplice liability has been a part of our jurisprudence for over four
hundred years demonstrates not only its endurance but its position as a
fundamental tenet of the common law. Far from a radical departure,
Pinkerton v. United States is a reaffirmation of this principle. The Pin-
kerton rule continues to be a viable theory of criminal liability.
125. Regina v. Saunders, 75 Eng. Rep. 706 (1573).
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